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Disclosure of Financial Information - Are 
New Zealand Employees and Unions Missing Out? 
Judy Brown* 
New Zealand policymakers have to date paid scant attention to the disclosure of financial 
information to employees and unions. However, there are signs this could change. Current 
trends under the Employment Contracts Act towards enterprise and productivity bargaining may 
well see access to financial information emerge as a domain of increasing interest ,and 
significance. The Labour Party's policies for industrial relations reform incorporate proposals 
for a good faith bargaining requirement, including a statutory duty to supply relevant 
information. Should any future government contemplate action on industrial democracy, this 
would also have implications for disclosure. This paper examines existing legislative 
requirements in the United States, United Kingdom and Europe. It is suggested that these 
provide a useful starting point for those interested in pursuing some New Zealand disclosure 
iniliatives and that so1ne valuable lessons can be drawn fronz ove~seas experiences. 
The regulated disclosure of financial information in Australasia is firmly aimed at the capital 
markets. In New Zealand, companies seeking to raise debt or equity funds from the public are 
required to provide a variety of financial discJosures under the Securities Act 1978. The 
Companies Act 1993 and Financial Reporting Act 1993 require "issuers" (those companies who 
have allotted securities to the public) to supply all shareholders with audited annual accounts at 
least once every year. These accounts must comply with "generally accepted accounting practice~~~ 
(approved financial reporting standards or, where there is no applicable standard, policies having 
"authoritative support" within the accounting profession in New Zealand). ~Companies that have 
their shares listed on the NZ Stock Exchange must produce half-yearly reports, preliminary final 
statements and audited annual r~eports drawn up in accordance with approved standards. Very 
similar requirements are provided under Australian securities and companies legislation. 
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Disclosure in the context of the labour market, on the other hand, remains a purely voluntary 
affair. New Zealand and Australian ~employers are under no statutory duty to provide financial 
infottnation to employ~ees or their representatives for collective bargaining or any other purposes. 
Companies legislation in New Zealand has recently been subject to a major review exercise. 
However, no amendments were included in the Companies Act 1993 or in the new Financial 
Reporting Act 1993 that would change this situation. The interests of the suppliers of financial 
capital remain the only ones deemed worthy of statutory protection1• Similarly, the issue of 
infottnation rights appears to have eluded drafters of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
The suggestion is sometimes made that labour interests can simply "make do" by relying on the 





It totally overlooks that the majority of employees are employed by companies that do not 
raise debt and equity funds from the public3. Non-public issuers must still prepare 
financial statements but ,are not required to disclose publicly any inforrnation relating to 
their finances and may dispense with an audit if all shareholders agree. In addition, under 
the Financial Reporting Act 1993, "exempt" companies (those with assets not exceeding 
Indeed the whole issue of employee rights in g~eneral and the accountability of companies to the public was 
conspicuous by its absence. Some measure of lack of interest can be gauged from the NZ Law 
Commission's preliminary discussion paper on ~company law refonn (NZ Law Commission, 1987), in which 
one paragraph (para.40) was devoted to the duties of a company to its employees and the public at large. 
The Commission recommended that a requirement under the old Companies Act (s.l33) for public 
companies to file a copy of their financial statements with the Companies Office for public inspection 
(which presumably did imply some notion of a broader accountability) be discontinued on the grounds that 
"the costs exceeded the benefits". The Commission found it "difficult to discern any independent public 
interest" in disclosure "beyond identification of the company and its r~esponsible officers" (para.l25). (In 
the event, s.l8 of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 still requires public disclosure of the accounts of 
publicly listed companies). The writer understands that the NZ Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) did 
make an approach to the Law Commission with the aim, inter alia, of raising the issue of disclosure rights 
for workers but was informed that the Commission regarded that as a matter for labour law not company 
law (a similar reaction to that received by the United Kingdom union movement 30 y~ears ago). In its 1989 
Report on the reforms, the Commission reiterates its view that "a Companies Act is not the appropriate 
vehicle for imposition of general social reforms" (NZ Law Commission, 1989: para.l9). 
The NZ Society of Accountants, for example, accepts that an entity's responsibility to report publicly is 
broader than its "legal" obligation. It regards the financial reports of public issuers as "general purpose 
financial reports" intended to meet the needs of external users "who are unable to require, or contract for, 
the preparation of special reports to meet their specific infonnation needs" (NZSA, 1993: para.l.5). In the 
initial Exposure Draft of its Statement of Concepts, employees were specifically mentioned as one such user 
group. Interestingly, this reference was dropped in the final draft although the Statement still talks more 
generally about those "providing resources" to entities. 
According to the NZ Law Commission ( 1989: para.17) "much less than one percent of compani~es raise 
capital from the public", with listed companies accounting for only 209 of the approximately 150,000 New 
Zealand registered companies. 
and not Sl otillion) are not to with 
BxemptioDB from all or part of partic11ler 
are also available to ce~tain other non-publie issuers under the NZ Society of 
' for Dljferential Reporting. This framework sdll 
fUrther the on shareholder needs, with the "separation of owners and 
govaning bodies" providing one of the three criteria for detern1ining whether a company 
may claim exemptions. 
Listed companies typically comprise complex of subsidiaries and sub-
subsidiaries. In these situations, consolidated accounts are prepared which present the 
results and financial position of the group of companies as though it was a single 
ente1prise. Thus, for example, the annual reports of Fletcher Challenge Ltd incorporate, 
1rt1er IlliG, the results of Crown Forest, Fletcher Construction and Petrocorp. · 
&QJUnta are useful to labour interests, for example, as a measure of a group's ability to 
• losses in a particular area. At the same time, because they contain very 
aeneml they are usually of limited value in answering about an 
:-..a:. • ~. I . ba • . • lndi .dual subsid. . do . ua~~VIud" entaprure orrgatn1ng •m•t Vllanes continue to prepare 
tbllr own accounts. However the bulk of subsidiaries controlled by listed are 
not public issuers and their accounts are not fteely available. 
Even leaving aside acaa difficulties, the interests and priorities of capital and labour and 
bencA-: tlurir inforanation needs differ. The argument that workers need, or indeed have a 
right to, financial info1•nation rests on a pluralist conception of organisations and centles 
around three main themes: sbengthening managerial accountability, wage bargaining and 
industrial democracy initiatives (for further background and detailed discussion of these 
points, Brown, 1992). From labour's point of view, profit is not a sufficient 
expression of the success of an enterprise. Corporate reports rarely contain substantive 
infoltfiation relating to the workforce, for example, on such matters as labour productivity, 
the range of incomes, fringe benefits, superannuation contributions, maintenance of 
entployee purchasing power, bansfer pricing policies, lev;els and locations of employment, 
skills baining or health and safety records. Moves towards a broader set of perfo1•nance 
measures in annual reports could help to secure increased accountability of management 
to et11ployees and various other non-shareholder constituencies. External reporting also 
offers the advantage of building up a systematic public record for analysis and comparison 
(Owen and Harte, 1984). However, such reports are never likely to be timely nor 
~· enough for wage contract or other bargaining purposes. The needs of 
agents are in many respects more akin to those of bankers or Inland Revenue 
who rely on special purpose financial reports. 
the 1970s a number of companies in New Zealand have adopted a practice of preparing 
annual reports for employees (Smith, 1985). However, in the absence of specific 
requirements or agreed accounting standards, companies are free to decide for 
the most appropriate fo1·m and content of these reports. In practice, they typically 
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contain only very simplified financial inforrnation and rarely allow for any meaningful analy · 
They have the added drawback of being unaudited so that users are provided with little ~ w ...... &~ 
about the credibility of the infortnation being reported. The NZCTU (1989: 17) understandabl 
regards such reports as owing more to a "corporate relations gimmick" than to genuine ~-­
of "infortnation sharing or participation". 
During the late 1980s/early 1990s recessionary economic conditions and moves toward --f'A,'"" .... 
bargaining also saw employers drawing attention to their financial situation to justify 
redundancies, closures and lower wage settlements: 
The Christchurch Star, which slashed its workforce by 40 percent yesterday, was losing $350,000 
a month, the daily evening newspaper's chainnan, David Stock, said (Dominion, 21 November 
1990). 
Workers at James Smiths in Lower Hutt have been told this week the store will close ... Staff 
were given no warning of the closure and were stunned to hear about it on Tuesday. They were 
told the "auditor said it's best", she said (Redundant worker, Dominion, 19 March 1992). 
Employees squeezing their employers into expensive (wage) settlements will find that those 
settlements impact on the competitive position of the employer - jeopardising their own job 
security. The driving force for employers had to be their financial position ... (NZ Employers 
Federation chief executive Steve Marshall, Dominion, 23 July 1992). 
Unions were frequently criticised for attempting to make wage settlements without sufficient 
regard to the economic consequences for the undertaking. The NZEF (1989: 15) wanted 
industrial relations to "become more a matter of the economic concerns of employer and 
employee and the organisation in which they are both concerned" and to be "conducted in a more 
rational and harmonious way". The NZ Business Roundtable (1989: 2) endorsed such an 
approach and observed that in "good employment relationships" employees would be "fairly 
rewarded for their efforts". Assuming (somewhat optimistically) that employees and labour 
representatives agree that a "fair" reward is one which results from the "free play" of market 
forces and contracts based on the financial circumstances of the individual firrn, it is difficult 
to see how "rational" workplace bargaining can take place or how employees can judge whether 
they have been "fairly rewarded" without their having rights of access to financial inforrnation. 
It seems both unrealistic and unreasonable to expect one party to bargain from a position of 
ignorance. Moreover to suggest, as the NZEF (1989: 17) did, that the recovery of the New 
Zealand economy depended upon profits being appropriated for "capital forrnation" rather than 
"wages or conditions" was implicitly asking workers for some fottn of investment which, even 
on the narrowest view, presumably entitled them to be treated as "owners" with infottnation 
rights. 
With corporate profits on the rebound, employers seem less enthusiastic about admitting ability 
to pay considerations into wage bargaining. In early 1994, the NZCTU queried where "the 
workers' share of the economic recovery was" after statistics indicated that average hourly pay 
rates barely moved in the previous year (NZ Herald, 24 February 1994). NZCTU President Ken 
WBF with profit by for 
perceat Ia the final of 1993), Air NZ (up 4S percatt ill the lilt half 
..S INL (up 32 percent for the half year). The following day Telecom annotmced that it 
to ~ workers' claims" but believed that "pay rises on the basis of inflation, 
profit or were "out of date" (NZ Herald, 25 Feb1uary 1994). The 
now to be for more individually forms of "merit pay". 
the 1990s interest in "employee communications" programmes has also been evident with 
of ideas propounded by HRM theorists (Townley, 1989; Storey, 1992). Some 
have established workplace consulta~ve committees and undertaken to provide 
info1n1ation" to facilitate consultation between management and labour. However, 
~ it seems that the decision as to what constitutes "relevant information" still lies primarily 
aad dle.re will be Httle representatives can do if a reftlaea tD 
wl I D7. This nwy in any Labour-led coalition The 
for relations refotm incolporates proposals for the int•oduction 
rccpJitaJJent, including a statutory duty to provide relevant 
to the Rt Hon. Helen Clark, it is envisaged that reqni•c•rcatts 
t I L n and provision made for the swift resolution of di&pdtes as to 
available to the parties" (Clark, 1993: 158). Should Labour 
to die • of its 1988 Committee of Inquiry into Industrial 
, this wouklalso bave implications for disclosure (see Report of the Cll11, 1989: 30-
etrective worker participation inevitably requires access to internal management accounting 
however, disclosure to unions and employees in New Zealand and Austlalia remains 
a matter of prerogative or, at best, the subject of private contlacting between 
and anployee groups. This "voluntarist" approach is in marked contrast to the situation 
exists in the United States, United Kingdom and throughout Europe where labour law 
duties on employers to supply worker representatives with a range of both general and 
purpose financial inforanation. 
States 
bas no statutes dealing directly with the disclosure of inforanation to employees 
However, the National Labor Relations Act 1935 (NLRA) imposes on 
and 1mions a duty to · in good faith. Case law, evolving since the mid-1930s, 
luis tbat this requirement gives unions the right to request from employers info1naation 
wbich is "relevant and to mtmdatory subjects of bargaining (wages, hours and other 
and conditioas of mnploym.ent). A United Kingdom Commission of Industrial Relations 
(1972: 37) noted that the underlying philosophy is that: 
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... without such information the lllliaD, • ltlrllfltJaa .. 
properly and the employer's to sappb' 
bargain in good faith as If he had failed to meet ad oenfor 
The question of "relevant and inf01n1ation has 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and court 
earnings, hours worked and job evaluation criteria 
to the union's role as bargaining agent The of 
United States means such info1auation must generally be made availablo at 
to comparative earnings data for other groups of workers is al8o 
of bargaining over fringe benefits has also given unions access to 
operation of health insurance and pension schemes. 
The phrase "relevant and necessary" has been interpreted more with J.'fJII*4 
of the employer's profits and other aspects of its financial situation. In NLIJI 
Manufacturing Co. ( 1956) the Supreme Court confirmed that as a general a 
cannot argue "inability to pay" to counter a union demand, and then refuse to 8UPP1J 
info1anation to substantiate its claim. The Court stated that if an inahjJity te pay 
important enough to present . . . it is important enough to require some- 101t of 
accuracy". This decision has been extended to cases where employers 
economic conditions dictate their position. In Cincinnati Cordage and Paper Co. (1963), 
NLRB held that the company's contention that it could not pay a wage increase-.\ 
competitive" was tantamount to a claim of "inability to pay" and that the Truitt rule rep1 
provision of substantiating information applied.4 
The ruling in Truitt has given unions access to breakdowns of ""* 
wages, raw materials, salaries, depreciation, and overheads and to · aho1lt 
and outgoing orders. However, in the absence of financial inability or a 
no presumptive right of access to such information. The employer must concur b I • 
pay is accepted as a relevant consideration. Thus where rejection of a wap is 
unwillingness rather than inability to pay there is no obligation to disclose, a 
regard as grossly inequitable: 
. . . companies that are unprofitable and financially weak are often quick to di•lole all lhe 
pertinent infonnation since it helps their cause. Financially Sbong companies, however, do aat ory 
poverty or an inability to meet the union's demands and thereby escape the obligation to Gpllldllir 
books (union official cited in Jain, 1981: 756). 
Disclosure rights apply to the administlation of existing contracts as well as to 
of future agreements. Information supplied must allow the bargaining agent to "UDdt • . ' .. ·, .,... ~ • ,_ r • , 
discuss intelligently" the issues raised in bargaining. It must be made available 
4 It should be noted that a simple disinclination to pay does not result in an obligation to 
infonnation. 
... Dll 
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wbich is reasonably useful and "not so burdensome or time consnnling as to impede the 
of · " (Old Line Lifo Insurance Co. 195 1) although not necessarily in the form 
by the union. 
are not entifted to demand disclosure of information related to pennissive subjects of 
&&&&&.loA (those over which parties may but do not have to bargain). This constraint flows from 
· acceptance of capital and managerial prerogatives and means unions are generally unable 
review sbategic management accounting information. Issues relating to the long-te1111 planning 
the enterprise - capital investlttent plans, plant location, product diversification, and so on -
are dunted to impinge only indirectly on the employment relationship and are, therefore, not 
.-ndatory subjects of bargaining. Similarly, decisions to close all or part of a company are not 
subject to mandatory bargaining because such decisions are held to lie "at the core of 
control" (Fibreboard Paper Products Ltd v NLRB 1964). That the employment 
.,&1111 of such decisions often lie "at the core of worlcer and union concern" appears by and 
to be ignored: 
Decilioas to continue subcontracting, to close one of several plants, to build a new plant, to 
liquidate to sell part or all of the enterprise, or to become part of a conglomaate are all 
decisi0111 which may be more important to the employees than wages or hours of work. 
Neveatheless. the courts have held that the employees have no right to be notified, no right to 
and no right to use their concerted efforts to affect these types of decisions. The impact 
on the employees' livelihoods and their futures may be far greater than the impact on the 
stoclcholden or management, but employees have no voice. They do not even have a right to know 
the business facts on which the decision was based; they are told only of the consequences which 
they must bear because of a unilateral management decision (Summers cited in Atleson, 1983: 6-7). 
NLRB has also noted that decisions "in which a significant investntent or withdrawal of 
will affect the scope and ultimate direction of the enterprise" are matters "essentially 
and managerial in nature" and involve "subject areas as to which detenninative financial 
operaboD&I considerations are likely to be unfamiliar to the employees and their 
· (Atleson, 1983: 130-1, emphasis added). The implicit assumption is that unions 
DOt only "too ill-equipped to deal with such complex and weighty matters" (ibid: 131) but that 
• decisions are essentially technical matters best left to the "experts". 
unployer may refuse to disclose "relevant and necessary" info11nation on the grounds of 
....,..· confidentiality or the need to protect individual privacy. In International 
ODtlworara "NLRB (1959) the Court of Appeal refused union access to production and sales 
· on the grounds that its release might have a detrimental effect on the competitive 
of the co•nployer. Since the 1979 Supreme Court decision in Detroit Edison, the NLRB 
the position that an employer's interest in refusing to disclose on confidentiality 
be "legitimate and substantial". The employer must also make a "good faith" effort 
provide the tmion with the data required in an alternative forn1 designed to protect the 
s while at the same time meeting the union's needs. 
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A disclosure request can also be refused on the grounds that the union's request is motivated 
solely by a desire to harass management or that the employer would have to go to "unreasonable" 
lengths to comply with the union's request (Whitin Machine Works 1955). For example, if the 
company does not nortnally prepare quarterly or half-yearly reports it is not obliged to start doing 
so (McLean-Arkansas Lumber Co. 1954). 
While employers may be required to produce certain inforntation, they may do so in specially 
prepared, unaudited reports. The union has no automatic right to inspect original documents or 
to appoint its own auditor (Jacobs Manufacturing Co. 1951). This is in marked contrast to the 
situation of the auditor acting on behalf of shareholders who has rights to examine all original 
documents. Where rights of access to original documentation are granted, the employer may 
insist that the accountant not be in the union's general employ (Yakima Frozen Foods 1961). 
Given the inability to subject employer submissions to independent analysis, it is perhaps not 
surprising that some unionists remain wary of active participation in financial disclosure. Union 
representatives surveyed by Palmer ( 1977: 32-3) complained that inforntation was often not 
forthcoming without an NLRB "unfair practices" threat and that "often the clarity, format, 
usefulness and reliability of the infottnation were poor". The most frequently mentioned specific 
criticisms related to "incomplete infortnation, selective disclosure of results and deceptive 
practices in accounting". The union representatives expressed a strong preference for the 
availability of financial inforntation that was "independently audited ... provided on an ongoing 
basis rather than only at contract bargaining time" and provided "non-selectively" in years of high 
and low profitability. 
If an employer refuses to disclose inforntation, the union has a right to file a complaint with the 
NLRB alleging that the employer is guilty of an unfair labour practice. Rulings of the Board do 
not carry the force of law and, if not accepted, must be advanced through the court system. 
Although the limits have been drawn tightly, United States employers are reported to regard the 
NLRB's general posture on disclosure as an invasion of managerial prerogatives (Foley and 
Maunders, 1977: 4). Unions have complained that employers fail "to meet even limited NLRB 
disclosure requirements" and that they are unable to correct this situation due to the time required 
to process an NLRB complaint (Palmer, 1977: 33). 
United Kingdom 
Compared with the situation in the United States and in Europe, the regulated disclosure of 
infottnation to labour representatives in the United Kingdom is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Statutory provisions were first introduced in the Industrial Relations Bill just before the Labour 
Government left office in 1970. Very similar provisions were subsequently enacted by the 
Conservative Government in the Industrial Relations Act 1971 but never became operative before 
they were repealed by the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act 1974. The current law on 
disclosure is as set out in the Employment Protection Act introduced by the Labour Government 
) 
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in 1975 and now incorporated in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
(TULRCA). It remains substantially along the lines of the 1971 Act. 
Section 181 of the TULRCA imposes a duty on employers at all stages of collective bargaining 
~ 
to disclose to recognised trade union representatives, on request, inforn1ation: 
without which the trade union representatives would be to a material extent impeded in ~carrying 
on ... collective bargaining, and infonnation which it would be in accordance with good industrial 
relations practice (to disclose) for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
The TULRCA imposes no obligation to disclose any specific item of infortnation. However, the 
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) has issued a Code of Practice which lists 
items which might be r~elevant to collective bargaining .. This includes reference to pay and fring~e 
benefits, non-wage labour costs, savings from increased produ~ctivity, sales and order book 
situation, cost structures, gross and net profits, sources of earnings, assets, liabilities, allocation 
of profits, government financial assistanc~e, transfer prices, intra-group loans and interest charged. 
These obligations are, however, limited in various ways under Section 182 of the TULRCA. The 
employer may refuse to disclose information on the grounds that disclosure would cause 
"substantial injury" to the firm (for r~easons other than its effect on collective bargaining) or that 
it would involve work or expense out of "reasonable proportion" to its value in collective 
bargaining. The ACAS Code of Practice envisages that the "'substantial injury" exemption might 
cover situations involving a potential loss of customers to competitors, the withholding of 
materials by suppliers or the impairment of the ability to raise business finance. Examples of 
infottnation which might cause substantial injury in these circumstances are given as follows: cost 
infortnation on individual products, detailed analyses of proposed investments, marketing or 
pricing policies and the make-up of tender prices. 
The employer may also refuse to disclose infortnation on the grounds that it would be against the 
interests of national security, would contrav~ene an Act of Parliament, was given to the employer 
in confidence, relates to an individual and consent has not been given to its disclosure or w,as 
obtained for use in legal proceedings. 
As in the United States, th~e employer is under no obligation to produce, or allow inspection of, 
any document other than the one specifically prepar~ed for the purpose of providing the 
infot tnation. 
If an employer refuses to disclose inforn1ation, the union has a right of appeal to the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC). The CAC may refer the matter to the ACAS for conciliation. 
If this fails, the matter must go to a full, fortnal hearing. A ruling is then made specifying what, 
if anything, the employer is required to disclose, and when. If an employer ignores a CAC 
ruling, the union may present a further complaint to the CA~C. If the further complaint is upheld, 
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the 1Jnion can ask the CAC to 81l 
for each of the individual 
In practice, unions have made only limited use of 
1980; Gospel and Willman, 1981; Jackson-Cox et al., 1987). Tile 
used in the first 16 months of its operation, with 74 references to the CAC. 
the number fell to 38 and this bend has continued with the..._._. 
rarely exceeding 20 (lnduslrial Relations Review and Report, 199!). A 
reasons have been offered for this: lack of or cynici••1 about die 
satisfaction with current disclosure levels, disenchantment with the leaislalioa 8lld 




Lock of interest or cynicism about the value of inforiHIJtlon - this IDes 
appear to be consistent with evidence of union enthtJsia•n for the concept of 
information disclosure (Trades Union Congress 1974; 1977; 1987). The rue (1971), 
example, recommends that union representatives make use of the 
find out about invesbnent and other company plans and to 
ag•eements with managements. During the 1970s, the union movement 
number of suggestions for improvements in financial methods aacl 
supported such practices as "value-added reporting"5• However Hussey and 
point to the lack of tradition in the United Kingdom of · collective 
on the basis of detailed fmancial, production and manpower inforauation. They obaeNI 
that new styles of "infol'llled bargaining", however sbongly supported at head oftice, 111111 
be far from easy to impress on the rank and file. Given that the United 
economy has been in a state of recession for most of the past 1 S years, there "IIY bave 
also been an understandable disinclination on the part of 1mions to actively "bad 
news". Fears of managerial incorporation, the absence of to woatplace 
democracy, scepticism about the credibility and impartiality of "managen1ent's facts and 
figures" and doubts about the independence of the accounting profession may also 
contribute to an "ostrich approach" to inforntation disclosure (Brown, 1992). 
Satisfaction with cu"ent disclosure levels - unions may already have to all the 
information they believe they need. There is some evidence that the passing of legislation 
has encouraged companies to adopt more open disclosure policies, without tmions baving 
Value-added reporting was quite widespread in the United Kingdom in the 1970s (for detailed 
see Burchell et al., 1985). "Value added" represents a broader concept of "income" thn "profit" aa.d is 
arguably more in keeping with a "stakeholder" theory of the corporation. It takes items like waps and 
salaries out of the category of costs (which on the face of it are desirable to minimise) and them 
as a share in the net proceeds of the enterprise. In practice, employen often used these statements to 
emphasise co-operation and team work in the creation of wealth but, from a pluralist fiame of reference, 
they also offer the advantage of making distributions and re-distributions of wealth within the enterprise 
more transparent. 
NC08r81 to the CAC 1910). by 
toaether with tbat obtained from aourcea (tle lllCidia, 
~ may be regarded by 1mions as sufficient for their Dair and 
(1979). for example, report a study of shop stewards who stated 1hey were 
· · and "could think of · more to ask beyond 
wl It wu being provided by (p.2S). Of course such professed 
may not so much point to the adequacy of infor•nation levels but rather the 
capacity of shop stewards to identify the specific inforn.-.ation which is (or could 
be) awilable and which could be of use. 
Disenchantment with the legislation - the passing of legislation may have encouraged 
United Kingdom employers to adopt more open disclosure policies. However predictions 
be a "twlatively simple task for (1•ions) to push back tBe tiontiers of 
that dley could simply ask for the inforn,ation they (Hilton, 
S) 111tve proved 
llave used the 1ULRCA provisions to access to infor••1a1ion on such mattus 
- aross profit pricing policies, pay scales, wage bills, ........... ll,i 
.- ll•iPilll budgets. More recendy, the CAC bas also accepted that unions req11ire 
· in order to CIIIY out a monitoring role with to the of 
pay systems and job giading schemes (Industrial Relations Review 
aad ~ 1992). However, in general, employers have been quite successful in limiting 
the t1ow of inforn1ation on the basis of the exemptions provided. 
Many have objected successfully to disclosures on the grounds of an absence 
of "material impediment". This bas, for example, proved a particular obstacle to unions 
seeking infoitnation they have managed without in the past. Where unions are as 
having alte1native means of obtaining the info11nation sought from employers, it bas also 
been held that they are not materially impeded (Clydesdale Bank Ltd and the Association 
of Sciel'llijic, Technical and Managerial Staffs, 1978). 
The issue of what constitutes "good industrial relations practice" bas also caused difficulty. 
The CAC does not see its brief in this area in terms of setting new disclosure standards: 
We feel that although we may adopt the broad principle that the more information that is 
the better for industrial relations, it is not for us to map out wholly new 
approaches to collective bargaining. We are not neces.vrily to seek a type of "genetal 
level" of bargaining practice. We are possibly entitled to take the best. We are not, we 
thillk, entided to take one that does not exist, declare it good and enforce it (Standard 
Telephones and Cables and ASTMS, 1979). 
At the same time, the CAC concedes that attempts to articulate a "good industrial 
relations" standard based on "best practices" have been somewhat hampered by the weak 
consensus on the issue: "infol'lnation which is commonly disclosed in one sector of 
• 
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industry may be 
1978). 
aa a lliiiiiY 
The CAC does appear to take the view tll8t 
if it reveals or confirms coDflicts of 
Journalists ( 1978) the CAC that a 
giving of info1Jnation between combatallt parties...., 
In that case disclosure was in such a 
excuse for a hostile reaction". In Sttmt:lortl Telep,_.., 
Committee denied union representatives acoesa to 
grounds that "such disclosure would actually be of atdt'e". 
The "substantial injury" cla11se has also been widely. ta 
on segment data, itemised costs, policies aad plant elea&Na 
on these grounds. Airwork Services and of 
(1978) concerned a union for info1•nation about the profits of 
England and Scotland. The union submitted that the --· 
it to make a wage claim on the company's profitability aad hlily PIJ 
at the airfields was awarded through a tendering system and the CAC llt1cl dl8t 
was likely to severely jeopardise the company's clvmcfa of rcnewiag 
fall into the hands of a competitor. An on the part of the 
confidentiality was rejected on the grounds that such would IJe 
maintain. In Hoover Ltd and General and Municipal Worlrera' Union (1919), lilt 
agreed that info1n1ation concetning the company's in'¥ ent policies. the 
production, product line sales, operating costs and was "highhy 
relevant" to collective bargaining. However, because the infmn,atioa was elao ef 
sensitive, commercial nature the employer was not obliged to • it. 
Unions have also experienced difficulties with employers supplyiDg 8JMI 
aggregated information and/or claiming that info1•n•tion ia "not 
When approached by unions requesting details of its cost structures in support of 
1978 wage claim the Ford motor company responded that 68 percent of ita C08II 
to "materials and services" and that a breakdown of this figure was "not 
et al., 1979: 18). 
The ACAS Code has also been criticised for not attempting to list basic im•ns 
should be disclosed in all circumstances and for omitting impottant ite•ns, 
prospective, organisational and international · (ibid: 21). In the early 1 
the ACAS explored the possibility of revising the Code but decided that "the 
divergent views that their preliminary consultations had revealed meant that it would 
premature to proceed with the revision at that time" (Jackson-Cox et al., 19&7: 198) • 
a 
~ . . ' . : ' 
.,. ', ' : l • 
.. lilnlted to ..... •• llr 
••• (for pie) a to IJIIpla ..... 
"- a aDject of tM ....-, M leal 81 
_... IDCI until the of ......... was extiDCied IJy ......-to dalt 
subject (Dtlli, Telell'tiPh Lid tllld IMIIIrlte of .louniDH818, 1918). 
TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee (1982) notes that any legislation on· 
11111 will have to be accompanied by further on disclosure in order to 
1Jiw uoious access to info1mation concerning policy and stlategy decisions. 
n. cost" clause places unions in the difficult position of having to 
cleJ the value of info1mation without having it. As Foley and 
(19TI: 18) it is exbemely difficult to define ex ante what the value of information 
wiD be. Nor is the question of what is an "unreasonable" amount of work or cost 
iavolved in making info1anation available self-evident (Marsh and Rosewell, 1976). 
Unreasonable by whose criteria? The costs of preparing info1n1ation should generally be 
quite low since much of the information would, in any case, be available for internal 
management purposes. 
As in the United States, there have been complaints about the lack of access to original 
documents. The CAC itself appears to feel uncomfortable with the Act's provisions in 
this respect. In one case it said that notwithstanding that it felt unable to award access 
to company records "it would be hard to deny the moral and customary right of the 
('•nion) to the information required" (Greater London Council and GLC Staff Association 
and the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 1979). 
Unions have also complained that the remedies available against employers who refuse 
to provide info1111ation are inadequate (General and Municipal Workers Union, 1978). 
The complaints procedure is cumbersome and provides employers with plenty of 
opportunities for procrastination. Unions going through the full procedure face a lengthy 
waiting period, by which time the infor1nation may be i11elevant. Penalty clauses are far 
from onerous. At worst, a non-complying employer is faced with possible legal action 
on an implied term of contract. The CAC has also expressed disquiet at the enforcement 
machinery. In one case where the employer had not complied with a disclosure ruling, 
the CAC felt unable to include the information in individual employment contracts: "We 
were presented with something of a problem as there can be important differences 
between information necessary for effective collective bargaining and information suitable 
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for inclusion in 111 
1979). 
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(d) Conslrtlints 011 the liSe of die 
depend for their eflsctivea.. the 
the info1anation concerned. and 
most doubtful part of the . Gold et aL 0~ 
the use of information arising from 
and problems in tJnion poUcy 804 
may, for example, feol ill-equipped to deal with 
inadequacies in the provision of research and ficiHtlea. 
Disclosure legislation - a move towards pluralism? 
In the United Kingdom and United States, the primary emphasis baa bela oa 
purposes of collective bargaining. NLRA and TULRCA 
acceptance of a pluralist perspective; there is recognition of a 
management and labour which needs to be negotiated and 
from the above review, nnitarist reasoning is evident in many of 1he jacliclal 
Decisions have by and large reinforced notions of au.d caplal 
a lilllt 
courts have been reluctant to substitute their own judgments for 
to endorse the "best" practices of employers. Managers are 
strategic decisions without notification or consultation (either as 
of their technical expertise). Where info11nation rights are 81 i 
control over the infor1nation that is to be collected and may dte for•, ia ..ttlch it is 
presented. There is a reluctance to enforce disclosure of information whioh or atafirms 
conflicts of interest. Unions are not trusted to preserve confidentiality. As a 
rights have not been extended as far as might originally have 111e 
approach to disclosure, by contrast, reflects a more explicit pluralist "stakeholder" with 
greater commitment to the philosophy of worker rights to consultation and participation iD the 
management of organisations. 
Europe 
t .,., ; t Works council schemes with statutory provisions for disclosure have in most European 
countries since the 1940s (British Institute of Management, 1957). This section foousea on the 
disclosure rights of Belgium works council representatives (Blanpain, 1992; National 
Consultative Council 1988) which are specified in greater detail than in manl other Hm~ 
countries. However, broadly similar rights are conferred by law in Austria, France, Omuumy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (ibid). 
\Wdcs co1mcils are mandatory in all eaterpriaea at 100 
S•acb C<nJncils, of e1nployee and up to ID ~- ber of 
must have at least four employee members in with 100 
to 22 members in undel~takings with more than 8,000 Under a 1973 Royal 
the employer is obliged to provide works council members with sufficient fiaancial and 
· to give them "a clear and accurate" view of the 1•ndcr11akiag and the legal, 
and fin•ocial entities of which it is a part. Where the · comprises 
~&& centres, relevant inforntation must also be provided with respect to sub-units. 
disclosures comprise four major categories: basic infornUttion, annual infoln,ation, 
infor11Jation and occasional information. Any documents given to shareholders must also 
provided to works council members. 
BIBle - detailed info1111ation must be given to works couucil ben within 
two aonths of their election or re-election on the legal status of the its 
..... ve position, production and productivity levels, financial slructnre, budgets and 
coat labour costs, investment plans and future prospects, research 
: ~ : I ; financial assistance and basic organisational structure. 
A1111ual information - within three months of the end of the fiMncial and before the 
general meeting of shareholders, information must be given on financial results for 
the past year, the utilisation of tax and financial incentives, a comparative analysis of 
objectives and achievements, economic and financial objectives for the coming year and 
future profit and employment prospects. Balance sheet and profit and loss account 
infor1nation must be compared with results from the two previous years and an analysis 
provided of changes in capital, reserves, debt levels, fixed and current depreciation 
taken, income and expenditure levels, profit distributions and managerial and non-
managerial remuneration. Detailed explanation of any changes in accounting policy must 
also be supplied. 
Periodic information - information must be supplied at least every three months on sales 
forecasts, order-book situation, costs, price changes, stock levels, productivity and 
employment, the use being made of any state aid received, budgetary control and the 
meeting of objectives. This infotntation is intended to enable works council members to 
make a judgement on the attainment of organisational objectives and must be in a fo1m 
which enables proper comparisons with basic and annual info11nation. 
(d) Occasional information- whenever events occur or internal decisions are being taken that 
could have "major implications" for the undertaking, infot111ation relating to the expected 
effects on the undertaking's activities and the employee's situation is to be supplied. 
Information should, wherever possible, be communicated before decisions take effect. 
The Royal Order emphasises that information supplied to works council members must be the 
"occasion of an exchange of views". Members have the right to "ask for additional inforiMtion, 
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Auditors are to to tho 
certify the "truth and completeaess" of dle 
Experts can also be invited to d works 001moil 
The other party has the right to refuse the expe1t but IIIIJ aot 
a pe1 iod. If persists, there is a risht of to 
Employee representatives are also entitled to attend 
on full pay for the purpose of developing their own ex1 
Employers can avoid certain specified categories of disclosures on the 
unde1·taking" but few companies are reported to do so (Hilton, 1978). Suell 
subject to prior approval by the of Commeroe. Bmployee 
are assigned the task of info1•ning staff of the undertaking on the baals of 
communicated to them "taking care to use it with all the discretion to 
undettaldng's interests". 
• 
Concern has been expressed about the level of compliance with the p1ovisioBS of 
Decree. Jain (1978), for example, reports a survey which found that about one ball of the ........ I 
surveyed provided the necessary inforruation and "two-thirds of the re•aainder were 
technical grounds: inadequate documentation, late · no 
Nonetheless, European disclosure practices are well ahead of those in the ~­
United States. 
European unions also have extended rights of access to info1•nation and oppom1nities to ......... 
the external fmancial reporting process through the two-tier system of company boards. 
Geiinany, for example, the supervisory board (Aufsichtsral), which the course 
business and which includes both employee and union representatives (on cabtin industly 
size criteria), approves the annual reports and examines board of management proposals for the 
appropriation of profits. Any member of the supervisory board can at aay time, 
inforrnation on affairs of importance for the enterprise. The management board has a sbltotory 
duty to meet such requests. 
European union 
In 1980 the European Commission issued a draft Directive - the "Vredeling" Directive -
to more clearly define employee rights to info1mation and consultation in with 
complex structures, in particular multinational enterprises. The Directive proved ...... ,...,.~ 
controversial and was amended substantially in an attempt to get the support of both 





to v n. Utd.toll 
aad ia 1993 .. 11· 
by dte Mila 
••loa aad I to 
IIJbmitted a modified version of the BWC 
Council of II (the United excluded). 
of the 11-State Directive was adopted in 1994, for implem I J; l I 
• The • provisions of the Directive are as follows: 
tmd aims of the Directive - the Directive provides a fiamework for the 
..... Ill'&&• of EWCs or other procedures for inforn1ing and consulting employees in 
•mdeztakings (and groups of undertakings) employing at least 1,000 wifhin the 
...... ber states and 150 or more employees in each of at least two member states . 
Negotiations over the establishment of EWCs or other procedures may be initiated by 
maugement or at the request of 100 employees or their representatives. This involves 
the establishment of a "special negotiating body" (SNB), made up of employee 
representatives, which is to negotiate an agreement with management. Unless the SNB 
decides (by a two-thirds majority) not to initiate or continue negotiations, this process 
must result in an agreement on an EWC or other procedure within three years of the 
request for negotiations. If not, or if management refuses to commence negotiations, a 
mininm set of info11nation and consultation requirements (refer1ed to as the "subsidiary 
requirements") applies. The Directive does not apply to groups and unde1taldngs where, 
by September 1996, '~ere is already an agreement, covering the entire workforce, 
providing for the transnational information and consultation of employees". 
Subsidiary requirements - the subsidiary requirements, which apply where management 
and workers cannot reach a voluntary agreement, require the establishment of an EWC 
and set out a number of rules on its competence, composition and operation. At least 
once a year, the EWC has the right to meet with central management, to be informed and 
consulted on the progress of the organisation's business and its prospects. Information 
For further details on the Directive's background and an analysis of the major differences between the BWC 
proposals and "Vredeling", see European Industrial Relations Review (BIRR, 1991; 1994&, band c). Since 
the Directive was adopted Austria, Finland and Sweden have joined the European Union. Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway are also bound by the Directive through the European Economic Area Agreement, 
bringing the total of countries covered to 17. 
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must refer to: the organisation's structure; its economic and .. &&I 
probable development of the business and of production and the emp 
situation and probable trends; invesbnents and substantial changes concerning ..... 
(including the introduction of new work methods or production processes, flansfers of 
production, mergers, cut-backs or closures and collective redundancies). 
Where there are "exceptional circumstances" affecting the employees' interests to "a 
considerable extent" - particularly in the event of relocations, closures or collective 
redundancies - employee representatives have the right to meet management with a view 
to being infor1ned and consulted on any measures significantly affecting employees' 
interests. The meeting must be timely and be based on a report from management on 
which the EWC may give an opinion. It is stressed, however, that the meeting will not 
affect the prerogatives of central management. 
The operating expenses of the EWC are to be met by central management, which must 
provide members with the financial and material resources necessary for them to ca11Y out 
their duties appropriately. The EWC may also be assisted by experts of its choice, insofar 
as this is necessary for it to carry out its tasks. Member states may lay down budgetary 
rules regarding the operation of the EWC and, in particular, limit funding to cover one 
expert only. 
(c) Confidential information - central management is not obliged to transmit information if 
this would "seriously harm" or prejudice the undertaking concerned. However, these 
confidentiality exemptions are only to apply in specific cases and under conditions and 
limits laid down by national legislation. Member states may also make such dispensation 
subject to prior administrative or judicial authorisation. 
(d) Disputes and enforcement - member states are to provide for "appropriate measures" in 
the event of failure to comply with the Directive. In particular, adequate adminisbative 
or judicial procedures must be available to enable obligations derived from the Directive 
to be enforced. Where member states allow management to restrict or withhold 
infor1nation on confidentiality grounds, they must ensure administrative or judicial appeal 
procedures are available to employees. 
The Directive's proposals have been the subject of considerable debate between the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and European private sector employers (see, for example, 
Pipkom, 1983; Hussey, 1984 and EIRR, 1991). ETUC favours greater transparency of 
multinational activities through mandatory, legal procedures for the disclosure of information. 
It has expressed concern at the "watering down" of the Directive through various modifications 
to the original draft and is also concerned about the issue of enforcement. Employer interest 
groups, on the other hand, argue that mandatory procedures would be unworkable for the separate 
member states, present a threat to managerial prerogatives, create problems regarding the 
confidential nature of infot·tnation and take no account of "economic necessities". United 
tile · 's impl lation dle ber of ap • 
• worken stood at approxill18tely 100 ( more 11100 
virtually all the countries bad taken steps to implem.cmt the 
COIJecliYC '8'CCIDCDts between central 
. 
' I ' , • ' I 
' t o ' I • I' 
.. 
of ..,.... of 
toavakllllilll 
• bcMtiel ! ' •' : ~· ; ~ 
of "botlom liae" 
...... - ' t-~ tl: ;, t. \ 
t aialrllt betweeD 
Mr overseas C011Dtclpatls, New ad .. aat 
RIIJ1C'Il t8 dte reg1Jiated disclosure of financial infotn,alion. In tiUs pap •• 1118 
-..., entploycrs are under no statutory cluly to -.y a-tal 
tD W.. bas been with the aisthlll 
U'liilld and throughout Europe. In the United rights to ad 
arise out of the employer's statutory duty to in good faith. In the 
are obliged to disclose infoJtMtiOD without which 
would be materially impeded from canying out theh\ collective duties 
1lldch it would be in accordance with "good industrial relations practice" to · .,."' 
~~ provisions at national and Coanmuaity level duties OD 
works councils and worker on with a 
any system will be firmly embedded in the socio-political of the 
aad may not tlaoslate easily. Nonetheless, labour in all CO'•ntries 
fll die same concerns, for example, about acco1•ntability, the abiHty 
in 811 manner, the importance of consultation and in that 
them and monitoring the efficiency and equity of · decision-making. 
the Employment Contracts Act towards entaprise and procbiCtivity 
provide oae of the more obvious starting points for unions and others interested in 
disclosure practice in New Zealand. The issue of inforrnation rights also 
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high priority on any agenda reform". In eidl•-. e-.--
provides a useful reference base. Some valuable leasous may also be drawa 
experiences concerning the importance of ensuring ~ legislative or 
not so widely drawn as to allow determined entployers to to disclose 
provide disclosure only when it suits them), the need for if 
representatives are to be in a position to use infor•nation effectively, the impo1fance of their 
able to gain some assurance about the credibility of the data supplied and the need for 
enforcement machinery. The review of United States and United Kingdom legislation also 
highlights the significance of judicial decision-making and the potential for judges to subve1t or 
at least reduce the impact of pluralist provisions through the (conscious or unconscious) 
application of unitarist reasoning to issues of interpretation. 
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